In this collection of interviews, Derrick Jensen discusses the destructive dominant culture with ten people who have devoted their lives to undermining it. Whether it is Carolyn Raffensperger and her radical approach to public health, or Thomas Berry on perceiving the sacred; be it Kathleen Dean Moore reminding us that our bodies are made of mountains, rivers, and sunlight; or Vine Deloria asserting that our dreams tell us more about the world than science ever can, the activists and philosophers (...) interviewed in How Shall I Live My Life? each bravely present a few of the endless forms that resistance can and must take. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss possible ways of measuring the power of arithmetical theories, and the possiblity of making an explication in Carnap's sense of this concept. Chaitin formulates several suggestions how to construct measures, and these suggestions are reviewed together with some new and old critical arguments. I also briefly review a measure I have designed together with some shortcomings of this measure. The conclusion of the paper is that it is not possible to formulate an explication of the (...) concept. (shrink)

St. Thomas’s commentary on the Book of Psalms, known as the Postilla super Psalmos, gives us a privileged insight into the mind and heart of a Dominican friar and theologian at work and at prayer. In this contribution I will elucidate these claims on the basis of elements found in his commentary and in particular in the areas of prayer and the liturgy, Christ, Mary and the Church, Sin and Mercy and Contemplation and Preaching.

Mathematical concepts are explications, in Carnap's sense, of vague or otherwise non-clear concepts; mathematical theories have an empirical and a deductive component. From this perspective, I argue that the empirical component of a mathematical theory may be tested together with the fruitfulness of its explications. Using these ideas, I furthermore give an argument for mathematical realism, based on the indispensability argument combined with a weakened version of confirmational holism.

One questioned premiss in the indispensability argument of Quine and Putnam is confirmational holism. In this paper I argue for a weakened form of holism, and thus a strengthened version of the ind ..

One potentially morally justified use of torture is found in philanthropic torture of a perpetrator (PTP): scenarios in which a perpetrator has instigated significant pending suffering against innocents and in which the suffering can be prevented by means of the perpetrator’s cooperation. These situations involve a clash of two intuitions: that torture is in some strong and obvious sense absolutely morally wrong, and that torture or harm of an immoral perpetrator may be permissible to prevent equally abhorrent, if not greater, (...) moral wrongs. My view is that a dually grounded view—permissible on theoretical grounds but wrong on practical grounds—can do justice to the conflicting intuitions we have about torture in cases of PTP. Further, I hold that practical “absolutism” will only be “mostly” or “likely” absolute, but that we should accept as adequate this “near absolutism”—it will give us the practical result we seek while also satisfying the intuition that we may act in otherwise untoward ways to prevent horrific moral harms. (shrink)

In this article I will claim that from a Thomist perspective the question “Soul or Brain: What makes us human?” presents us with a false dilemma and hence must as such remain an unanswerable question. In order to corroborate this claim I will do two things. First, I present the framework of a Thomistic anthropology in so far as it relates to the unity of soul and body in the human person. Next, I deal with the question that immediately results (...) from this unity, i.e. the subsistence of the soul. From a Thomist perspective this question can be answered apart from any findings from neuroscience. (shrink)

Some recent views of action have claimed that a correct conceptual account of action must include second-order motivational states. This follows from the fact that first-order motivational states such as desires account for action or mere behavior in which the agent's participation is lacking; thus, first-order motivational states cannot by themselves account for action in which the agent participates, so-called full-blooded action. I argue that representing the agent's participation by means of second-order states is bound to fail because it misrepresents (...) what an agent is doing when acting in the full-blooded sense. I begin by characterizing full-blooded action and explaining the failure of first-order accounts to explain it. I next show that while second-order accounts have some success in explaining full-blooded action, they fail to distinguish it from action which exhibits motivational alienation. I then argue that even if this problem were resolved, the second-order accounts more fundamentally misrepresent full-blooded action by depicting such action in an introverted manner. I conclude by considering a sketch of agency and full-blooded action that does not rely on second-order states and by addressing a primary concern thought to favor the second-order accounts, the concern of agent causation. (shrink)

Abstract: In this article, I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, which I call enlightened value maximization. Enlightened value maximization utilizes much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders, and specifies long-term value maximization or value seeking as the firm’s objective. This proposal therefore solves the problems that arise (...) from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, which is the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory, explaining how this theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard that gives no score—that is, no single-valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organization or division (and it must be consistent with the organization’s strategy), and as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organization it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the number of procedural and substantive tension points with which a conscientious whistleblower struggles. Included in the former are such questions as: (1) Am I properly depicting the seriousness of the problem? (2) Have I secured the information properly, analyzed it appropriately, and presented it fairly? (3) Are my motives appropriate? (4) Have I tried fully enough to have the problem corrected within the organization? (5) Should I blow the whistle while still a member of the organization (...) or after having left it? (6) Should I keep anonymity? (7) How ethical is it to assume the role of a judge? (8) How ethical is it to set in motion an act which will likely be very costly to many people? Substantive tension points include such questions as: (1) How fully am I living up to my moral obligations to my organization and my colleagues? (2) Am I appropriately upholding the ethical standards of my profession? (3) How adversely will my action affect my family and other primary groups? (4) Am I being true to myself? (5) How will my action affect the health of such basic values as freedom of expression, independent judgment, courage, fairness, cooperativeness, and loyalty? (shrink)

Consider a sequence of outcomes of descending value, A > B > C >... > Z. According to Larry Temkin, there are reasons to deny the continuity axiom in certain ‘extreme’ cases, i.e. cases of triplets of outcomes A, B and Z, where A and B differ little in value, but B and Z differ greatly. But, Temkin argues, if we assume continuity for ‘easy’ cases, i.e. cases where the loss is small, we can derive continuity for the ‘extreme’ case (...) by applying the axiom of substitution and the axiom of transitivity. The rejection of continuity for ‘extreme’ cases therefore renders the triad of continuity in ‘easy’ cases, the axiom of substitution and the axiom of transitivity inconsistent.As shown by Arrhenius and Rabinowitz, Temkin's argument is flawed. I present a result which is stronger than their alternative proof of an inconsistency. However, this result is not quite what Temkin intends, because it only refers to an ordinal ranking of the outcomes in the sequence, whereas Temkin appeals to intuitions about the size of gains and losses. Against this background, it is argued that Temkin's trilemma never gets off the ground. This is because Temkin appeals to two mutually inconsistent conceptions of aggregation of value. Once these are clearly separated, it will transpire, in connection with each of them, that one of the principles to be rejected does not appear plausible. Hence, there is nothing surprising or challenging about the result; it is merely a corollary to Expected Utility Theory. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.UNACCEPTABLE RISKS AND THE CONTINUITY AXIOMVolume 28, Issue 1Karsten Klint Jensen DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267112000107Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. UNACCEPTABLE RISKS AND THE CONTINUITY AXIOMVolume 28, Issue 1Karsten Klint Jensen DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267112000107Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. UNACCEPTABLE RISKS AND THE CONTINUITY AXIOMVolume 28, Issue 1Karsten Klint Jensen DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267112000107Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

En analyse af de videns- og forskningsformer der bestemmer pædagogikens karakter. Der sondres mellem tre 1. forskning om hver der virker, 2. forskning med henblik på at forklare og forstå - dvs. udvikle teorier og 3. forskning der søger anvendelse af teorier i et nødvendigt samspil med filosofisk antropologi og etik.

Jeff McMahan famously defends a moral inequality of combatants, where liability to be attacked and potentially killed in war, should be grounded in the individual combatant’s moral responsibility for posing an unjust threat. In a response, Seth Lazar shows that McMahan’s criterion for liability leads to an unacceptable dilemma between “contingent pacifism” and “total war”, i.e. between war being practically infeasible, or implausibly many civilians being legitimate targets. The problem is that McMahan grounds liability mainly in the individual’s causal responsibility (...) for posing an unjust threat, but where a large proportion of combatants and civilians are approximately equally causally responsible. Recently, Saba Bazargan has come to the aid of McMahan by injecting an alternative supplementary criterion for liability, namely the individual’s complicity in a group act. This criterion is supposed to uphold the noted moral inequality, while avoiding the responsibility dilemma, by grounding moral incrimination in the individual’s participatory intention, instead of her causal contribution. I argue that the complicity account fails to resolve the dilemma. It fails because complicity grounded in a causally inert participatory intention is insufficient for liability. Further, I show why this reveals a deeper problem with the complicity account itself, namely that though it purports to ground incrimination non-causally, it fails to do so to any serious extent. (shrink)

Den historiske udvikling af teoretisk pædagogik i dansk sammenhæng.

In 1955 the fi rst Danish chair in education was set up at the University of Copenhagen and Knud Grue-Sørensen – Doctor of Philosophy – became appointed as holder of the chair. In 1965 the chair had an institute,Institute of Educational Th eory, connected to it.The following deals with the nineteen years in which Grue-Sørensen worked as a professor of educationat the university. The assumption upon which the essay rests is that his main ambition during theseyears was to lay the (...) scientific foundations of educational theory as a an autonomous discipline in its own rightnext to neighbouring disciplines like, say, psychology and sociology. Although well acquainted with those disciplineshe nevertheless consequently subjected their research results to critical examination of their relevanceto the solution of educational problems. Infl uenced in general by a strong interest in language matters andby English philosophers in particular he practiced a method of ordinarylanguage analysis and applied it to bring to light important language nuances often overlooked in empiricalresearch. Convincingly, he demonstrated this method in his analysis of the concept of learning. (shrink)

Can one consistently deny the permissibility of abortion while endorsing the killing of human embryos for the sake of stem cell research? The question is not trivial; for even if one accepts that abortion is prima facie wrong in all cases, there are significant differences with many of the embryos used for stem cell research from those involved in abortion—most prominently, many have been abandoned in vitro, and appear to have no reasonably likely meaningful future. On these grounds one might (...) think to maintain a strong position against abortion but endorse killing human embryos for the sake of stem cell research and its promising benefits. I will argue, however, that these differences are not decisive. Thus, one who accepts a strong view against abortion is committed to the moral impermissibility of killing human embryos for the sake of stem cell research. I do not argue for the moral standing of either abortion or the killing of embryos for stem cell research; I only argue for the relation between the two. Thus the conclusion is relevant to those with a strong view in favor of the permissibility of killing embryos for the sake of research as much as for those who may strongly oppose abortion; neither can consider their position in isolation from the other. (shrink)

In the past decade, the meaning of Hegel's idea of a ‘science of logic’ has become a matter of intense philosophical debate. This article examines the two most influential yet opposed contemporary readings of the Science of Logic—often referred to as the ‘metaphysical’ and ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretations. I argue that this debate should be reframed as a contest between logic as ontology (LAO) and logic as metaphysics (LAM). According to Stephen Houlgate's interpretation of logic as ontology, the science of logic is (...) a progressively explicit unfolding of the categories of thought, which is at the same time the process by which being itself determines what it is to be. A second interpretation has been pursued by Sebastian Rödl and Robert Pippin, who read Hegel's logic as metaphysics. On this reading, the science of logic is a progressively coherent unfolding of the categories of thought, which articulate all that it could intelligibly mean to be. This article intervenes in this debate in three key ways. First, I argue that Houlgate's ontological approach undermines his attempt to establish the objective validity of the categories. Second, I show that the LAM emphasis on the crucial idea of apperception enables it to succeed where Houlgate fails by doing justice to the rational necessity with which the Logic unfolds. Third, I argue that, despite this success, the LAM program remains unrealized because of its neglect of Hegel's understanding of cognition as a form of life. While LAM has compellingly unfolded the ‘thought of being’, it has ignored the inverse question of the ‘being of thought’. I attempt to fulfil the LAM program by elaborating Hegel's account of what it means to be a thinker. (shrink)

From a certain philosophical perspective, one that is at least as old as Plato but which is addressed also by Aristotle and Kant, business ethics – to the extent that it is marketed as form of enlightened self-interest — constitutes a Thrasymachean compromise: to argue that it is to our advantage to conduct business ethically, perhaps even advantageous to the bottom-line, comes curiously close to endorsing what Plato called the 'shadow of virtue' — i.e., of becoming temperate for the sake (...) of illtemperance. And yet it also seems true that moralistic campaigns to achieve the impossible, e.g., pursuing justice for its own sake or eradicating egoism, often "detract from attaining really important things." This essay explores the need, in business ethics as well as elsewhere, to make — what Dewey and Niebuhr considered to be — painful if not principled philosophical compromises in order to secure is a society in which there would be "enough justice to avoid complete disaster.". (shrink)

What role does birth play in the debate about elective abortion? Does the wrongness of infanticide imply the wrongness of late-term abortion? In this paper, I argue that the same or similar factors that make birth morally significant with regard to abortion make meaningful viability morally significant due to the relatively arbitrary time of birth. I do this by considering the positions of Mary Anne Warren and José Luis Bermúdez who argue that birth is significant enough that the wrongness of (...) infanticide does not imply the wrongness of late-term abortion. On the basis of the relatively arbitrary timing of birth, I argue that meaningful viability is the point at which elective abortion is prima facie morally wrong. (shrink)

I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general (...) methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein. (shrink)

Michael Barnwell has helpfully clarified his criticisms of Aquinas’s explanation of proto-sins. In this response, I further clarify my own defense of Aquinas. Although the sinner lacks one rule, he has at hand another: he is aware that if he chooses, then he must have the rule of his action. This rule is conditional, that is, he is not obliged—categorically—to have the rule at hand; rather, he is obliged to have the rule only if he chooses. An additional clarification concerns (...) the manner in which the sinner is aware that he lacks the rule. More precisely, he is aware that he might not have the rule. In a proto-sin, then, the sinner is aware that if he chooses an action, then that action should be ordered to the end, and he is also aware that the good he desires while acting might not be ordered to the end. (shrink)

Ecosystems, the human brain, ant colonies, and economic networks are all complex systems displaying collective behaviour, or emergence, beyond the sum of their parts. Complexity science is the systematic investigation of these emergent phenomena, and stretches across disciplines, from physics and mathematics, to biological and social sciences. This introductory textbook provides detailed coverage of this rapidly growing field, accommodating readers from a variety of backgrounds, and with varying levels of mathematical skill. Part I presents the underlying principles of complexity science, (...) to ensure students have a solid understanding of the conceptual framework. The second part introduces the key mathematical tools central to complexity science, gradually developing the mathematical formalism, with more advanced material provided in boxes. A broad range of end of chapter problems and extended projects offer opportunities for homework assignments and student research projects, with solutions available to instructors online. Key terms are highlighted in bold and listed in a glossary for easy reference, while annotated reading lists offer the option for extended reading and research. (shrink)

McDowell and Merleau-Ponty share a critical attitude towards a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. According to the picture in question nothing which properly belongs to subjectivity can be hidden to the subject herself. Nevertheless there is a striking asymmetry in how the two philosophers portray the problematic consequences of such a picture. They can seem to offer exact opposite views of these consequences, which, given the almost identical characterization of the transparency claim, is puzzling. I argue that a closer (...) look at the prima facie puzzling asymmetry dissolves the apparent disagreement and reveals a deeper agreement concerning both the nature and the origin of the problems haunting the Cartesian picture in question. Both McDowell and Merleau-Ponty argue that on the picture of the relation of between mind and world in question, we lose our grip on the very idea of a perceptual appearance. Furthermore, the two authors regard a certain conception of nature as conceived in the image of science, as one of the crucial elements in making the picture of the mind in question look attractive. (shrink)

The philosophical situation at Copenhagen University in the 1960’s was dominated by two positivists. Th elogical positivist Jørgen Jørgensen – who had written the history of the “movement” – and the legal positivistAlf Ross. There were also two “outsiders”: Peter Zinkernagel, who did more analytical philosophy of language in the British style, and K. Grue Sørensen who was working in the traditions of neo-Kantianism. In 1955 Grue-Sørensen was hired as the first professor in education – after a long controversy (...) about the scientific status ofeducation as a discipline – but with a focus on the history of education. He had received a doctoral degree in philosophy in 1950 with a dissertation on refl exivity as a philosophical concept and a thesis about the reflexivity of consciousness. He was also an objectivist in ethics, and had been critical of the prevalent moral relativism and subjectivism found in recent philosophy. Jørgensen and Ross had done important work on moral argumentation with more technical work on the logic of imperatives and norms. Moral objectivism was not only wrong but in a way also “immoral” because it undermined their belief in democracy. Especially Jørgensen also thought that the idea of reflexivity was wrong when applied to consciousness. Neither statements nor consciousness could be reflexive – that is refer to themselves/itself. The reflexivity of consciousness is – according to Jørgensen – simply not an empirical psychological fact. Grue-Sørensen tried to establish the foundation of a theory of education based both on conceptions of consciousness and of the relation between scientific knowledge – facts – and moral values – in a neo-Kantian fashion. For him the interplay between ethics and knowledge was a central part of a theory of education – a belief due to which he never became a professor of philosophy – having tried many times. These debates in philosophy and in education were superseded in the 1970’s by the rise in influence of the German inspiration from Critical Theory and the demise of logical positivism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Identity Transitions Connection or Alienation? “I want to be involved” Rites of Passage Daddy at Last Postscript Notes.

This essay centers on the notion of the symbolic and its impact as developed by Claude Lévi-Strauss in his Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss. I examine Lévi-Strauss’ formulation of the “floating signifier” and its influence in French thought, particularly in the work of Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida. In doing so, I argue that Lévi-Strauss’ notion may be a misreading of the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure that has important implications for contemporary political issues on the left (...) in both theory and practice. (shrink)

Integrating and building on the constitutional ethics paradigm proposed by Paul Roush and the neo-intuitionist moral decision-making scheme proposed by Robert Audi, I defend a novel decisionmaking procedure for hard moral choices in the military. The key to Roush’s model of justifiable disobedience is a soldier’s ability to recognize when an ostensibly legal order constitutes a ‘fundamental violation of justice’. However, the nature and structure of this act of moral recognition requires more elucidation than Roush has provided. In order to (...) avoid grounding moral recognition and decision-making on a narrowly partisan account of moral theory, I appeal to Audi’s neo-intuitionist account of prima facie moral duties. I then repurpose and develop further a decision procedure that Audi proposed for the business context. When faced with an ethical dilemma in military service, a soldier should classify his/her obligations; identify the conflicts between his/her obligations; assess the weightiness of his/ her obligations; determine ethically viable options; and then make a decision. I close the discussion with an examination of the practical problems one might face in adopting the proposal. (shrink)

We study type 1 premice equipped with supercomplete extenders. In this paper, we show that such premice are normally iterable and all normal iteration trees of type 1 premice has a unique cofinal branch. We give a construction of an KC type model using supercomplete type 1 extenders.

Human reproductive cloning provides the possibility of genetically related children for persons for whom present technologies are ineffective. I argue that the desire for genetically related children is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to engage in human reproductive cloning. I show this by arguing that the value underlying the desire for genetically related children implies a tension between the parent and the future child. This tension stems from an instance of a deprivation and violates a general principle of reasons (...) for deprivation. Alternative considerations, such as a right to procreative autonomy, do not appear helpful in making the case for human reproductive cloning merely on the basis of the desire for genetically related children. (shrink)

The recent discussions on “The Right and the Good” show that the reconciliation between formalism and teleology is still a problem. Some of the contending parties lean more strongly towards formalism, others towards teleology; but neither side has, I believe, done equal justice to formalism and teleology. To review the whole discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I propose to suggest in outline a theory which may possibly harmonize the essential tenets of both parties.

I argue that, despite similarities between them, Hayden White has fundamentally misunderstood Nietzsche’s philosophy of history. White, like many postmodern historical theorists, attributes to Nietzsche a truth-relativism with respect to historical facts and a value-relativism with respect to the worth of competing interpretations. I show that both of these attributions take insufficient account of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Nietzsche rejects relativism and endorses interpretations that further the interests of particular types of life. When Nietzsche’s position is properly distinguished from the kind of (...) relativism ascribed by White, it will appear a coherent middle-ground between the positivist construal of historical truth and post-modern truth relativism. (shrink)

The general public in Europe seems tohave lost its confidence in food safety. Theremedy for this, as proposed by the Commissionof the EU, is a scientific rearmament. Thequestion, however, is whether more science willbe able to overturn the public distrust.Present experience seems to suggest thecontrary, because there is widespread distrustin the science-based governmental controlsystems. The answer to this problem is thecreation of an independent scientificFood Authority. However, we argue thatindependent scientific advice alone is unlikelyto re-establish public confidence. It is muchmore (...) important to make the scientific advicetransparent, i.e., to state explicitlythe factual and normative premises on which itis based. Risk assessments are based on arather narrow, but well-defined notion of risk.However, the public is concerned with a broadervalue context that comprises both benefits andrisks. Transparency and understanding of thepublic's perception of food risks is anecessary first step in establishing theurgently required public dialogue about thecomplex value questions involved in foodproduction. (shrink)

This essay describes a visionary philosophy of education at Morehouse College. The educational process at Morehouse, construed here as a form of pedagogical personalism, is personified in three luminaries of Morehouse College: Benjamin Elijah Mays, Howard Washington Thurman, and Martin Luther King. The educational process at Morehouse should be interpreted as an ambivalent response to segregation and discrimination in Jim Crow America. Like all black institutions in the South, Morehouse was subject to racist constraints; Morehouse was created and existed in (...) large part due to just such constraints. I attempt to more accurately describe in order to more sensitively appreciate not only how historically black colleges and universities helped to shape the spiritual or intellectual blueprint of the civil rights movement but also how they served—and continue to serve—as ongoing experiments in democratic education. By way of conclusion, I suggest that the pedagogical personalism espoused and practiced at Morehouse College during what has been called her golden age, i.e., 1940–1967, constitutes a significant contribution to the history of higher education in America. (shrink)

Abstract. In this essay, I describe my Cultural-Developmental Template Approach to moral psychology. This theory draws on my research with the Three Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity, and the work of many other scholars. The cultural-developmental synthesis suggests that the Ethic of Autonomy emerges early in people's psychological lives, and continues to hold some importance across the lifespan. But Autonomy is not alone. The Ethic of Community too emerges early and appears to increase in importance across the life course. (...) Then, it also seems that in most places and at most times, the Ethic of Divinity has found a voice—and in some traditions this ethic may become audible in adolescence. Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity, then, may have universal roots in the human condition. However, they are also clearly culturally and historically situated. Cultural communities—whether defined by religious, national, or other boundaries—vary in how they prioritize the three ethics and the extent to which they reinforce their development. (shrink)

This essay reads acclaimed poet James Galvin’s 1992 semi-autobiographical novel through the lenses of Martin Heidegger’s notion of authenticity and Patrick Wolfe’s discussion of settler-colonialism. I argue that Lyle, arguably the novel’s main character, is portrayed as living “authentically” in contrast to the deep inauthenticity of Ferris. I connect Western authentic dwelling with settler-colonial logic, centering my account on the figures of the “lazy” and “magical” “Indian.” Ultimately, I find that far from rejecting settler-colonial logic Galvin’s text plays out of (...) a return of the repressed of the present absence of indigenous persons in the land and the text. (shrink)

A common objection to the Molinist account of divine providence states that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom lack grounds. Some Molinists appeal to brute counterfactual facts about the subject of the CCF in order to ground CCFs. Others argue that CCFs are grounded by the subject's actions in nearby worlds. In this article, I argue that Open Theism's account of divine providence employs would-probably conditionals that are most plausibly grounded by either brute facts about the subject of these conditionals or non-actual (...) entities. As a result, Open Theism's revision of the traditional notion of divine providence is unmotivated. The Molinist can ground CCFs just as easily as the Openist can ground would-probably conditionals but the Molinist has the advantage of maintaining a robust account of divine providence.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.On grounding God's knowledge of the probableVolume 49, Issue 1JENNIFER JENSEN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000182Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. On grounding God's knowledge of the probableVolume 49, Issue 1JENNIFER JENSEN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000182Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. On grounding God's knowledge of the probableVolume 49, Issue 1JENNIFER JENSEN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000182Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Background Making appropriate end-of-life decisions in the intensive care unit (ICU) requires shared interprofessional decision-making. Thus, a decision-making climate that values the contributions of all team members, addresses diverse opinions and seeks consensus among team members is necessary. Little is known about religion’s influence on ethical decision-making climates. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the association between religious belief and ethical decision-making climates. Methods The study was a cross-sectional analytical observation study as a part of the prospective observational DISPROPRICUS study. (...) A total of 2,275 nurses and 717 physicians from 68 ICUs representing 12 countries in Europe and the US participated. All participants were asked which religion (if any) they belonged to and how important their religion (if any) was for their professional attitude towards end-of-life care. Perceptions of ethical decision-making climates were evaluated using a validated, 35-item self-assessment questionnaire that evaluates seven factors. Using cluster analysis, ICUs were categorised into four ethical decision-making climates: good, average (with nurses’ involvement at the end of life), average (without nurses’ involvement at the end of life) and poor. Results Of the 2,992 participants, 453 (15%) were religious (had religious convictions and found them important or very important for their attitude towards end-of-life care). The remaining 2,539 were non-religious (i.e. had religious convictions but assessed that they were not important for their attitude towards end-of-life care). When adjusting for country and ICU, the overall perception of the four ethical climates was associated with religious beliefs, with non-religious healthcare providers having more positive perceptions of the ethical climates compared to religious healthcare providers (p < 0.01). Within good climates, non-religious healthcare providers rated leadership by physicians (p < 0.01), interdisciplinary reflection (p = 0.049) and active decision-making by physicians (p = 0.02) as more positive compared to religious participants. In poor climates, religious healthcare providers had a more positive perception of the active involvement of nurses (p = 0.01). Within the other climates, no differences were found. Conclusions Overall perceptions of ethical decision-making climates were associated with religious beliefs, with non-religious healthcare providers generally having a more positive perception of the ethical climates than religious healthcare providers. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s relationship with Burckhardt’s image of the Renaissance was a way of practicing history. Nietzsche shared with Burckhardt the preference for typology, the belief that truth is reached intuitively and concerns the inner identity of all things, and for great cultural historical objects and individuals. And he shared it with him in some part precisely because two of their most significant common influences were Goethe and Schopenhauer. Beyond this, I argue that there are a few minor and a few more (...) significant disjunctions in their approach to the historiography of the Renaissance. I address what we might call the question of motive: that Burckhardt’s purpose in construing the Renaissance was in fact quite opposed to Nietzsche’s more radical gaze upon history. (shrink)

James Griffin has considered a form of superiority in value that is weaker than lexical priority as a possible remedy to the Repugnant Conclusion. In this article, I demonstrate that, in a context where value is additive, this weaker form collapses into the stronger form of superiority. And in a context where value is non-additive, weak superiority does not amount to a radical value difference at all. These results are applied on one of Larry Temkin's cases against transitivity. I demonstrate (...) that Temkin appeals to two conflicting notions of aggregation. I then spell out the consequences of these results for different interpretations of Griffin's suggestion regarding population ethics. None of them comes out very successful, but perhaps they nevertheless retain some interest. (shrink)

Fifty years ago, in 1961, Feinstein published his first path-breaking articles leading to his seminal work Clinical Judgement and to the establishment of clinical epidemiology. Feinstein had an Aristotelian approach to scientific method: methods must be adapted to the material examined. Feinstein died 10 years ago and few years before his death he concluded that efforts to promote a person-oriented medicine had failed. He criticised medicine for not having recognized that only persons can suitably observe, evaluate and rate their own (...) health status. Feinstein’s position was—as in Clinical Judgement—methodological. He didn’t espouse ethical principles. He pointed to methodological deficiencies in clinical epidemiology and evidence-based medicine. In this article we’ll provide a framework for understanding and justifying Feinstein’s call for a person-oriented medicine which recognizes patients as co-actors in clinical reasoning. It’s argued that craftsmanship and practical wisdom are integrated in clinical judgement and reasoning and that clinical reasoning is not only about means to achieve the end, health. We do also reason and deliberate about ends. The ‘defining end’ of medicine (health) has continuously been negotiated and so been the object of deliberation. For centuries among professionals, in recent years among professionals and patients. These negotiations and deliberations lead to ongoing specifications of health as a ‘guiding end’, i.e. an end guiding clinical reasoning about what to do in particular situations. Feinstein’s self-critical account to clinical epidemiology at the end of his professional career reflects the fact that patients during the last 30–40 years (i.e. in the period after the publication of Clinical Judgement) widely have been recognized as persons with rights to autonomy. Feinstein’s lesson is, however, that espousing and recognizing ethical ideals is not enough. A change of clinical practice and its methods is necessary. His critique also implies that clinical epidemiology and evidence-based medicine as practiced haven’t provided such a turn. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to reflect on how the Corona pandemic might influence human understanding of our position of being in the world. In the first part of the paper, we present how a pandemic can be under- stood in relation to our society and our educational system. Then, we will present problems and questions highlighted by the pandemic and the kind of transformations needed to address these problems. The core ele- ments that require transformation are the understanding (...) of the essence of man or the human condition, the understanding of what caring for nature and even a pandemic means, and how to measure human action and values. (shrink)

Translator's introduction : At the end of July 2014 there was a week-long workshop held at the Ecole des Mines in Paris, Bruno Latour's former work-place. This was a final workshop, convened by Latour's project, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, which was not only a book, but a website that was an experiment in interactive metaphysics that had been going on for four years. About 30 participants gathered to workshop and rewrite some key contested areas that had been challenged (...) on the site with discussions and counter-examples. One of the round tables working away during the week, occasionally with changes in personnel, was on Nature. Their job (like the other round tables on Politics, Diplomacy, Religion and Economics) was to ‘reboot’ or reinstitute a concept close to the heart of the Moderns. The assumption was that the traditional concept of nature, as developed through modern European history, would no longer be adequate to a future beset by environmental crises. The main people working on a draft were Didier Debaise, Pablo Jensen, Pierre Montebello, Nicolas Prignot, Isabelle Stengers and Aline Wiame. When they finished the draft, I translated it and it was presented, in French and English, in a final two-day public session at Science Po, to a group of seven international scholars designated as “chargés d'affaires,” or “diplomats from the future” whose job was to assess the results of our labours in terms of how they might be met by Gaia, the ur-representative of future planetary crises. The text, originally under the title of Our “Nature,” was as follows. [Stephen Muecke]. (shrink)